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Community-based healthcare organisations manage
competing, and often conflicting, priorities. These conflicts
can arise from the multiple roles these organisations take
up, and from the diverse range of stakeholders to whom
they must be responsive. Often such conflicts may be titled
conflicts of interest; however, what precisely constitutes
such conflicts and what should be done about them is not
always clear. Clarity about the duties owed by
organisations and the roles they assume can help identify
and manage some of these conflicts. Taking divisions of
general practice in Australia as an example, this paper sets
out to distinguish two main types of conflicts of interest, so
that they may be more clearly identified and more
effectively managed.
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D
ivisions of general practice (DGPs) are
recent arrivals on the healthcare scene in
Australia. They engage in a broad range of
activities, including population health pro-
grammes, IT and general practice support for
general practitioners, continuing medical educa-
tion, research and evaluation activities, health
initiatives targeted at particular groups, and
allied health programmes.1 The broad scope of
these activities means that DGPs need to manage
competing priorities for time and resources in
pursuit of their aims.
Generally, the principal stakeholders of com-
munity-based healthcare organisations are the
communities they are intended to serve. Many
organisations (eg, the Cancer Councils of
Australia) exist to serve specific groups in the
community, and these groups are their stake-
holders. In the case of DGPs, they support
primary healthcare services by supporting the
activities of general practitioners working in the
community, giving them both general practi-
tioners and their communities as stakeholders.
The Commonwealth government from which the
DGPs receive most of their funding (as part of
the DGP programme) is also a stakeholder.2
From an organisational perspective, DGPs are
membership-based organisations and have
duties to act in the interests of their members.
As recipients of federal funding, the
Commonwealth government expects DGPs to
demonstrate achievements in line with their
national priorities (box 1), via the National
Performance Indicators.2 Although many of the
expectations outlined by the federal government
may fit well with local, member-focused activ-
ities, balancing local priorities and those in line
with the national priority areas may not be a
straightforward matter for DGPs.
IDENTIFYING CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
Standard-model conflicts of interest
The task of managing competing priorities is one
shared by organisations and people alike. But
what distinguishes a conflict of interest from
mere competing priorities? Conflicts of interest
on the standard view are commonly understood
to occur when the capacity of people or
organisations to fulfil their duties to others
seems under threat of interference or compro-
mise because of external interests.3 Importantly,
what is at stake in conflicts of interest is not
simply the proper exercise of judgement, but the
proper exercise of judgement in decisions made
on behalf of others. Decisions in line with this
kind of obligation are normally held to follow
from the role held by the decision maker (be it a
person or an organisation). A role such as that of
company director or public servant or doctor
requires people to make decisions and recom-
mendations that serve others, who trust the role
incumbent to make the decision or recommen-
dation only on grounds that make for good
decisions, not some other indirectly related set of
interests or concerns.4 A conflict of interest risks
not simply that judgement may be impaired, but
further the possibility of a breach of trust with
respect to the proper conduct of that role. It is the
fidelity of judgement, and not merely the conflict
of interest itself that is of concern in cases of
conflicts of interest.
DGPs are at risk of having conflicts of interest
on this standard view. One example is where
DGPs act as gatekeepers for research by third
parties who may wish to do research with local
general practitioners, their practices or their
patients. A typical example would be that where
a DGP is approached to support a research
project by facilitating the recruitment of general
practitioners or their patients. DGPs have to
balance the benefits of supporting research and
an ongoing contribution to the evidence base by
protecting members, their practices and their
patients from potential harms such as breaches
of privacy or over-exposure to research. Decision
making here may be compromised by a conflict
of interest where greater access to funding
sources may act as an undue inducement to
facilitate further research. Here, the conflict of
interest is not simply that DGPs must balance
access to participants or data with protecting
confidentiality and preventing over-research;
this responsibility accompanies the role of being
a DGP. The conflict of interest (or potential for
Abbreviation: DGPs, Divisions of General Practice
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such a conflict) lies in this responsibility being compromised
by a relationship with a third party. In this example, DGPs
have to manage internal competing priorities that arise,
legitimately, from the role of DGPs acting in the interests of
their members. There is some inherent conflict among these
priorities themselves. The conflict of interest, however, occurs
because of an interest or relationship with an external party.5
In this case, the interest is the potential financial advantage
from the external funding source, which may skew the
decision in favour of research, rather than basing it on the
needs and interests of potential research participants.
In-role conflicts
Apart from a standard model of conflicts of interest, there are
also situations where decision makers find that they have
legitimate duties to pursue different priorities on behalf of
different parties (eg, the interests of general practitioners and
patients) or where they perceive conflicting duties or
conflicting roles arising from obligations owed to their
principal stakeholders. In these conflicts there is no external
interest exerting influence; rather, the conflict arises in the
scope of the obligations owed by the organisation and its
management to the stakeholders. These in-role conflicts,
although awkward to deal with for organisations, may in
some senses at least be regarded as just ‘‘part of the job’’.
Such conflicts may therefore be distinguishable from
conflicts of interest understood on the standard model,3 as
there is no third party relationship or interest that potentially
compromises the roles in question; each role is legitimate and
creates duties that ought to be fulfilled.
As Kalucy et al1 say in their report on DGPs, the challenge
faced by them is to achieve a balance among local and
national priorities, among the needs of members and their
communities, and those of the federal government and a
growing number of other funding bodies.1 With respect to the
federal government’s national priorities, managing this
balance (for DGPs) entails weighing their original and, some
would still say, primary priority of representing and support-
ing the interests of local member general practitioners
against those priorities more broadly reflective of national
health strategies, the pursuit of which may work against the
interests of local members. For example, pursuing priorities
2, 4 and 5 may increase the workloads of general
practitioners, with no matched increase in remuneration. In
this example we are able to identify the presence of
competing interests. Is it useful, however, to identify them
as conflicts of interest? If so, why?
We can make a distinction between conflicts of interest in
which decision makers must fulfil several roles in the service
of a single principal (many roles, one principal) and those in
which the person or organisation assumes a single role in the
service of more than one principal (many principals, one
role).6 Both are described as ‘‘in-role’’ conflicts of interest,
distinguishable from the ‘‘out-of-role’’ conflicts akin to
conflicts of interest on the standard view.3 The difficulty in
applying this distinction in cases such as that of DGPs is that,
although prima facie some organisations seem to be prone to
conflicts of the second kind (many principals, one role), it is
easy to see how various, possibly competing roles may issue
from relationships with and obligations to each principal,
creating the possibility of conflicts with multiple principals
and multiple roles. Although it is useful to be able to
distinguish in-role conflicts of interest from those on the
standard view, more work needs to be carried out to bridge
theoretical accounts of such conflicts with those encountered
in practice, such as occurs in DGPs.
In the case of DGPs, there are increasing accountability
requirements for federal funding (via the national priorities),
which may lead to more conflicts of this kind. The role of
DGPs will increasingly entail reconciling competing priorities
in pursuit of the interests of their multiple principals: the
federal government, which supports their continued exis-
tence and the membership around whose priorities and
principles the organisations were originally founded; and
multiple roles: membership-based organisations focused on
local interests and needs, and a broader role in the pursuit of
national public health priorities. The challenge for DGPs is
not in disclosing or avoiding such conflicts; it is rather in
attempting to manage the competing priorities that inevitably
arise.
MANAGING CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
To clearly identify types of conflicts is an important step
towards their management, as each type needs to be
managed differently. Conflicts of interest on the standard
model are amenable to standard sorts of solutions: disclosure,
recusal or substitution on the part of the decision maker, or
the termination of the offending relationship itself.7–9 Options
include eliminating the conflict, accepting either the inevit-
ability or the innocuous nature of the conflict, or taking steps
to avert the possibility that judgement may be compromised.
The onus here is on showing that external interests—for
example, financial gain, prestige or public recognition—will
not exert an undue influence on the core duties of the
organisation. A key strategy is thus to clarify the organisa-
tion’s core aims, roles and associated duties, and to be
ruthless in identifying and ruling out external or illegitimate
ones. Conflicts of interest of the standard type normally
respond well to such remedies.
The distinction between conflicts of interest (on the
standard view) and the other kind of role conflicts identified
above is important, as conflicts of the second type respond to
different remedies. Role conflicts result from the range of
legitimate roles and duties that organisations have. The
problem is not the fault of the decision makers concerned;
rather, conflicts arise because organisations are committed to
duties that become contingently incompatible. Standard
approaches, such as disclosure or recusal, are not effective
in such cases. Substituting the decision maker does not
eliminate the conflict, as the conflict is not associated with
private, personal interests. There are some measures that may
be used in other conflicts, which resemble this sort of role
conflict. For example, it may be possible to deal with a
conflict between auditing and provision of financial advice by
splitting off potentially conflicting functions into separate
organisational units separated by so-called ‘‘Chinese walls’’.10
However, such measures are also unavailable in cases such as
ours, because it is impossible or impracticable to allocate
different decisions or functions to different parts of the
organisation.
With respect to managing such conflicts, O’Neill11 notes
that it can be useful to use a design analogy to describe a
commitment to a range of competing and possibly conflicting
Box 1 National priorit ies2
N Supporting general practice in a changing environ-
ment
N Improving access
N Encouraging integration and multi-disciplinary care
N Focus on prevention and early intervention
N Improved chronic disease management
N Supporting quality and evidence -based care
N Growing consumer focus
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duties, much like having to balance design constraints on a
construction project (quality, the scale of the project, cost,
time to completion, safety standards and so on). Hard choices
are often required in situations where the roles of decision
makers make conflicting demands, and not all priorities may
be pursued equally. When faced with competing priorities in
this way, judgement is ‘‘a matter of finding some act … or
policy that meets a plurality of requirements’’, and some-
times there will unavoidably be ‘‘remainders’’ that call for
regret.11 Skill in managing such conflicts lies in establishing
which of these constraints may be traded off against others
(eg, time to completion) and which may not (eg, safety
standards). Good judgement here is needed to arrive at the
best overall outcome without undue compromise; however,
any remainders, no matter how good the outcome, still need
to be accounted for. Transparency and a clear focus on which
duties can be met and which cannot become instrumental to
this end.
Transparency and the mere disclosure of potential conflicts
and unmet priorities, however, are not enough. There
remains the danger of an attitude in management that as
such conflicts and remainders seem inevitable, and not all of
the organisation’s roles need be fulfilled completely, it may
be perfectly acceptable to allow one role (eg, representing the
interests of the membership) to be emphasised to the
exclusion of others. Staying with the example of DGPs, we
propose three further strategies for managing this. The
following represent some basic steps towards offering
structural incentives to prevent boards of management
converging unevenly around the roles they have duties to
fulfil. Following from more general accounts of acting in
good faith and avoiding conflicts of interest,4 they describe
strategies for helping to prevent decision-making processes
from focusing on one role or set of obligations at the expense
of others.
(1) Identifying aims and duties: each division should
formally identify what its aims and duties are and the
minimum acceptable standards of performance in regard
to those aims and duties. It then needs to assess whether
it has the capacity to meet those minimum standards in
respect of each of those aims and duties. Where trade-
offs occur, adverse effects on competing priorities should
be noted, ideally as part of the strategic planning process.
(2) Structural factors—representation: boards of divisions
should seek a composition that includes a diverse range
of competence and background. This should include
people with a stake in the various aims or duties
identified by the DGP’s board of management—for
example, community representatives and individuals
representative of local risk group populations (HIV/
AIDS, etc). Such measures can help to avoid ‘‘group-
think’’.12 Excluding stakeholders from decision-making
processes may be more risky in the long run than being
more inclusive and running the risk of dissenting views
in discussion.
(3) Accountability and dialogue: divisions should ensure that
they are accountable to their various stakeholders. As
membership-based organisations, they need to be
accountable to their members for activities that seek to
conform to the requirements of the federal government.
As taxpayer-funded organisations, they need to account
to the federal government for the extent to which their
activities aim to further the interests of their members.
This implies a process of open and explicit dialogue that
should inform the identification of minimum acceptable
standards of performance at (1) above. It should inform
thinking within each division about the extent to which
its different aims and duties can be simultaneously
fulfilled, and should also inform the division’s work on a
continuing basis.
CONCLUSION
The challenge of managing competing priorities is common to
all public and semipublic organisations. Many difficulties
may be attributed to conflicts of interest of one form or
another. In the case of DGPs, some instances clearly resemble
conflicts of interest. In others, conflicts do not arise through a
person or institution having an external relationship that
risks compromise to the primary duties of the role; they arise
instead because of conflicts within or between the legitimate
roles and activities of the organisation. Although these role
conflicts do not conform to the standard view of conflicts of
interest, they remain nonetheless conflicts between duties
owed to a range of stakeholders and the interests that follow
from the range of activities they pursue. This distinction is
important, as it helps reframe the question of how such
conflicts may be best managed when standard measures fail
to be effective. The roles of organisations need to be clearly
defined and the potential for conflict should be anticipated
and managed appropriately. Steps should also be taken to
include stakeholders to whom duties are owed in the
definition of the role and priorities of organisations to help
ensure accountability in the sense that the legitimate
expectations are met with regard to the role and duties of
organisations and are appropriately defined and acted upon.
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